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ABSTRACT
The relationship of dogmatism and anxiety to reinforce­
ment effects in an operant verbal conditioning situation was 
investigated. The major hypothesis, based upon Rokeach*s 
cognitive theory of open and closed belief systems, was that 
high scorers on the Dogmatism Scale should show greater con­
ditioning effects than low scorers on the Dogmatism Scale.
A similar prediction was made for anxiety, as measured by 
the MAS, based upon earlier work with this scale.
An original pool of 369 university students were ad­
ministered the Dogmatism Scale and the MAS. Sixty subjects, 
whose scores fell in the upper and/or lower 30^ of the score 
distributions on these two scales were divided into four ex­
perimental groups. Group I was composed of 15 high dogmatic, 
high anxious subjects; Group II of 15 high dogmatic, low 
anxious subjects; Group III of 15 low dogmatic, high anxious 
subjects; and Group IV of 15 low dogmatic, low anxious sub­
jects.
Subjects were presented with a series of 100 cards, 
each of which contained a verb and six personal pronouns. 
Subjects constructed sentences using the verb and beginning 
with any one of the pronouns. An operant level was estab­
lished for each subject on the first 20 cards (trials).
vi
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The two pronouns which were least frequently used on oper­
ant trials were chosen for each subject for reinforcement.
On Trials 21 through 100, subjects were reinforced by the 
experimenter’s saying "good" following all sentences be­
ginning with either of the two critical pronouns, A post­
session questionnaire was administered in order to determine 
each subject’s awareness of the reinforcement contingency. 
Data was analyzed by means of an analysis of variance 
of repeated measures over all trial blocks, and by an anal­
ysis of covariance of total response frequency for rein­
forced trials combined, adjusted for operant level. Results 
indicated significant learning in all groups. Both analyses 
revealed a significant difference between high and low dog­
matism groups, with the conditioning of low dogmatics being 
consistently superior. Differences in high and low anxiety 
groups were in the direction of better performance for low 
scorers on the MAS but these differences were significant 
only with the covariance analysis. Interaction effects were 
not significant. These results represent a clear-cut rever­
sal of the first hypothesis of this study and no support for 
the second hypothesis,
A subject was designated aware if he could specify 
either one or both of the pronouns for which reinforcement 
was given. There was no difference in the occurrence of 
awareness in either the two dogmatism groups or in the two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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anxiety groups* Awareness was related to superior condi­
tioning in all groups* When data of high and low dogmatism 
groups and of high and low anxiety groups were analyzed at 
each level of awareness, the only significant difference 
found was in unaware dogmatism groups*
The failure of high-anxious subjects to show greater 
conditioning effects was considered as support for similar 
findings in two earlier studies* Possible explanations of 
the greater susceptibility to reinforcement in the low dog­
matism group were discussed in light of Rokeach®s theory*
It was suggested that the theoretical superiority of low 
dogmatics to make cognitive discriminations and to separate 
relevant from irrelevant information might account for the 
results* Interpretation of the results was made also in 
terms of possible characteristic differences in high and 
low dogmatics in breadth of phenomenal field* Implications 
for further research were discussed*
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent exposition of his cognitive theory, 
Rokeach (i960) has suggested a property of the individual, 
that of "dogmatism,” which may be related to response in 
reinforcement situationso Rokeach proposes that indivi­
duals vary along a dimension of open-closedness of belief- 
disbelief systems» The belief-disbelief system serves as 
a total cognitive structural framework which regulates 
responses and through which information is screened»
Rokeach has constructed a reliable instrument, the Dogma­
tism Scale (Rokeach, I96O; p« 71), which is designed to 
measure the conceptual properties of belief systems. A 
relatively high score on the Dogmatism Scale defines the 
cognitively closed person, whereas a relatively low score 
defines the cognitively open person»
One way in which the extremes on the belief system 
continuum differ is in the degree of reliance upon author­
ity;
The more open one*s belief system, the more should 
evaluating and acting on information proceed independ­
ently on its own merits in accord with the inner struc­
tural requirements of the situation. Also the more 
open the belief system, the more should the person be 
governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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forces and less by irrational inner forces* Conse­
quently, the more should he be able to resist pres­
sures exerted by external sources to evaluate and to 
act in accord with their wishes* One important 
implication here is that the more open the personas 
belief system, the more strength he should have to 
resist externally imposed reinforcements, or rewards 
and punishments* * . •
Conversely, the more closed the belief system, 
the more difficult should it be to distinguish between 
information received about the world and information 
received about the source* * » * To the extent that a 
person cannot distinguish the two kinds of information 
received from the source, he should not be free to re­
ceive, evaluate, and act upon information in terms of 
inner requirodness. He should be exposed to pressures, 
rewards and punishments, meted out by the source de­
signed to make him evaluate and act on the information 
in a way the source wants him to (Rokeach, 1960j p.
58)*
According to Rokeach (I96O), both the open-minded and 
closed-minded person depend upon external authority to pro­
vide information* The open-minded person, however, is more 
able to judge and act- on incoming information in a rational 
manner, unhampered by irrelevant considerations not perti­
nent to the cognitive requirements of the situation* On
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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"the other hand, for the closed person the power of authority 
depends less on cognitive evaluation of the information 
itself « Irrational pressures such as needs, inappropriate 
sets and perceptual cues, and external reinforcements tend 
to take precedence in determining response in high dogmatic 
individuals* Rokeach (I96O) further reasons that extremes 
on the dogmatism continuum may exemplify different theo­
retical models of behavior. He suggests that persons with 
relatively open systems behave more in accord with Gestalt- 
cognitive theories, while persons with relatively closed 
systems act more in accord with reinforcement (S-R) theo­
ries of learning.
This theoretical position suggests that individuals 
scoring high on dogmatism should show greater suscepti­
bility to arbitrary external reinforcement than persons 
scoring low on dogmatism. Where there exists no cognitive 
basis for the selection of a particular response, high dog­
matics should be swayed by reward given by the experimenter- 
authority to a greater degree than should low dogmatics. It 
is with this general hypothesis that this study is concerned, 
A verbal conditioning procedure offers particular ad­
vantage for a test of this hypothesis. In recent years 
there has been increasing interest in the extension of con­
ditioning principles to verbal behavior and a firm body of 
knowledge has been accumulated. Operant conditioning 
studies, using the Skinner paradigm, account for much of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this work. Comprehensive reviews of research in this area 
have been published by Krasner (1958) and by Salzinger
(1959).
The importance of the principle of reinforcement in 
the modification of verbal responses has received special 
attention and the results are impressive. The work of 
Greenspoon (1954, 1955) has been particularly influential 
in demonstrating the application of reinforcement theory 
to verbal behavior. Using both verbal utterances ("mmm- 
hmm") and a light as reinforcers, he was able to increase 
the output of plural nouns in a free-responding situation. 
Verplanck (1955, 1956) demonstrated significant increases 
in opinion statements by paraphrasing or agreeing with 
subjects* responses in ordinary conversation, Salzinger 
and Pisoni (1958) conditioned affect statements in the 
diagnostic interview by means of verbal agreement, Cohen, 
Kalish, Thurston, and Cohen (1954) report an increase in 
"I" and "we" pronouns using "good" as a reinforcing stim­
ulus. Many others, e.g., Hildum and Brown (1956), Binder, 
McConnell, and Sjoholm (1957), Nuthman (1957), Hartman 
(1955), and Leventhal (1959), have shown the effectiveness 
of "good" as a reinforcing agent in the operant condition­
ing of various classes of verbal responses.
There have been relatively few studies which have been 
concerned with subject variables in the operant conditioning 
of verbal behavior. An exception to this has been the
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interest in the anxiety variable growing out of the work of 
Taylor (1951) and Spence and associates (I95I, 1953),
Within the framework of Hull's theory of motivation, Taylor 
(1951) hypothesized that emotionality or anxiety, as meas­
ured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), contribu­
ted to drive level. With anxiety thus posited as a drive, 
Taylor found that high-anxious subjects showed a higher 
level of performance in classical conditioning of the eye­
lid response than did low-anxious subjects. These findings 
have been confirmed by Spence and Taylor (1951)» Taylor 
and Chapman (1955) have reported that paired associate 
learning was similarly related to anxiety.
Building on these findings, Taffel (1955) investigated 
the effects of anxiety, as measured by the MAS, upon the 
conditioning of verbal behavior in hospitalized psychiatric 
patients. He introduced an interesting procedure in which 
subjects were required to form a sentence when presented 
with a verb and a choice of six personal pronouns. He found 
that the frequency of the pronouns, "I" and "we”, could be 
significantly increased by use of verbal reinforcement for 
high-anxious and medium-anxious subjects. Low-anxious sub­
jects were unaffected, Sarason (1957) found that subjects 
scoring high on an anxiety scale (devised by Sarason) in­
creased their output of activity verbs in response to verbal 
reinforcement. Not all studies, however, have shown anxiety 
to be a significant variable in verbal conditioning. Daily
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(1953) found no significant differences between anxious and 
non-anxious groups of normal (non-hbspitalized) subjects in 
the frequency of reinforced pronouns, "I" and "we »" Buss 
and Gerjuoy (1958) using the same procedure, identical cut­
off socres for anxiety, and a similar patient group as that 
used by Taffel (1955) also report negative findings for 
anxiety differences*
It is to be noted that Rokeach (i960) reports a re­
lationship of dogmatism to anxiety. Persons with relatively 
closed systems tend to score higher on measures of manifest 
anxiety than those with open systems* Rokeach (I960; p* 69) 
theorizes that relatively closed cognitive systems may 
represent a defense against anxiety. Correlations between 
scores on the Dogmatism Scale and the Welch Anxiety Scale 
(similar to the Taylor scale) are reported to be positive 
and significant* Such correlations obtained in the U, S, 
and in England with college and worker samples range from 
,36 to *64, with an average correlation of «51 (Rokeach, 
i960; p. 348)* In addition, results of two factor-analytic 
studies (Rokeach and Fruchter, 1956; Fruchter, Rokeach, and 
Novak, 1958) show dogmatism and anxiety emerging as part of 
the same factor. This relationship has been substantiated 
using the MAS, with a correlation of ,56 between MAS and 
Dogmatism scores being found by Vidulich (1960) in a south­
ern college sample. The two measures were also factorially
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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related for this sample.
In view of these findings, in analyzing the relation­
ship of dogmatism to conditioning behavior it would seem 
essential to account for the possible influence of anxiety 
with which dogmatism is correlated» Rokeach*s theory
(i960) leads to the prediction that high dogmatics will 
perform better than will low dogmatics in a verbal condi­
tioning situation. Although the findings relating anxiety 
to conditioning are equivocable, the drive theory of 
Taylor (1951) leads to a similar prediction regarding high 
and low anxious subjects in a verbal conditioning situation. 
This raises the question of whether any differences which 
might be found in the conditioning of high and low dogmatics 
might not be attributed to the drive properties of anxiety 
rather than to the cognitive characteristics of closed and 
open systems,
The study reported here therefore was concerned with 
determining the relationship of dogmatism and anxiety to 
reinforcement effects in the operant conditioning of ver­
bal behavior. The following two specific hypotheses were 
examined:
1. In an operant verbal conditioning situation, groups 
of individuals scoring relatively high on the Dogmatism 
Scale should show greater conditioning effects than groups 
of individuals scoring relatively low on the Dogmatism 
Scale, independent of the influence of the anxiety variable.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2. In an operant verbal conditioning situation, groups 
of individuals scoring relatively high on the Manifest Anx­
iety Scale should show greater conditioning effects than 
groups of individuals scoring relatively low on the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale, independent of the influence of the dogmatism 
variable.
For the purposes of this study the openness-closedness 
of belief systems, or dogmatism, was defined in terms of a 
score on the Dogmatism Scale (Form E), Anxiety was defined 
in terms of a score on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale 
(MAS).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
METHOD
The procedure used was a modification of that intro­
duced by Taffel (1955).
Materials» The materials consisted of 100 stimulus 
cards, the Dogmatism Scale (Form E), and the Taylor Mani­
fest Anxiety Scale» This material is presented in Appen­
dices A-C»
The stimulus cards were 3 x 5 unlined index cards» A 
verb in the simple past tense was typed in upper-case let­
ters in the center of each card» Six pronouns (I, WE, YOU, 
HE, SHE, and THEY), also typed in upper-case letters, were 
placed in a horizontal sequence directly below each verb.
The orders of the six pronouns were randomized for the 
series of 100 cards.
Subjects. Students from introductory psychology 
courses at Louisiana State University served as the popu­
lation from which the experimental subjects (Ss) were drawn. 
Subjects were chosen during the initial weeks of course work 
in the spring semester of 1961, in order to ensure as much 
naivetl as possible regarding conditioning procedures.
Three hundred and sixty-nine students enrolled in these 
classes were given the Dogmatism Scale and the MAS under 
classroom conditions. The correlation between Dogmatism
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and MAS scores for this original pool of students was •35.
The score ranges, means, and standard deviations are pre­
sented in Table 1.
From this pool of students, 60 Ss were selected for 
individual experimentation on the basis of scores on the 
two scales. Forty-one males and 19 females were included. 
These Ŝ s were selected so as to form four groups: Group I
(HD-HA) consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the upper 30^ of 
both the dogmatism and anxiety distributions; Group II 
(HD-LA) consisted of 15 Ŝ s who scored in the upper 30^ in 
dogmatism and in the lower 30^ in anxiety; Group III 
(LD-HA) consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the lower 30% in 
dogmatism and in the upper 30% in anxiety; Group IV (LD-LA) 
consisted of 15 Ss who scored in the lower 30% of both dis­
tributions. Thus the sample consisted of 30 Ŝ s high on 
dogmatism, 30 Ss low on dogmatism, 30 Ŝ s high on anxiety, 
and 30 Ss low on anxiety. Final assignment of Ss to groups 
was not made by E, in order to eliminate possible bias 
arising from E*s knowledge of the group identity of any S. 
Means and standard deviations of scale scores for each of 
the experimental groups are presented in Table 2. There are 
small but significant differences in the means of the two 
high dogmatism groups (between I and II p = .01) and of the 
two low dogmatism groups (between III and IV p = .02). These 
differences reflect the greater difficulty in pairing the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 1
Dogmatism and MAS Scores for Student Population
Scale N Range Mean S.D.
Dogmatism 369 70-224 163*66* 23*55
MAS 369 0-43 16,87 7,96
*A matter of incidental interest is the fact that this 
mean Dogmatism score, representing a southern college sam­
ple, is approximately 20 points higher than means reported 
by Rokeach (I960) for northern student groups. Means for 
the latter typically range from I4I to 144*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 2











I (HD-HA) 15 200.47 12.43 28.00 - 5.48
II (HD-LA) 15 185.20 9.02 7.73 3.06
III (LD-HA) 15 138.00 16.91 25.73 5.46
IV (LD-LA) 15 118.73 20.87 8.13 2.38
Combined High 30 192.83 23.14 26.87 5.06
Combined Low 30 128.37 21.08 7.93 2,72
^Significance of difference between means;
For Dogmatism
I vs II p = .01 
III vs IV p = .02
For Anxiety
I vs III p = N.S, 
II vs IV p = N.S.
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correlated Dogmatism and MAS scores so as to meet the high- 
low criteria of Groups II and III. The net effect is that 
there is some confounding of the anxiety variable with dog­
matism, there being a slightly lower mean dogmatism score 
associated with low anxiety than with high anxiety. No 
such differences exist with respect to MAS means indicating 
adequate control for the dogmatism variable.
Procedure. Each ^  was seen individually. The stimu­
lus cards were placed on a rack directly in front of the S 
who was seated across a small table from Cards were
exposed one by one by successive removal of the top cards 
by E. A small screen shielded E ’s recording of responses 
from the view of the S.
Subjects were instructed to construct a sentence con­
taining the verb indicated on each stimulus card and begin­
ning with any one of the pronouns. Specific instructions 
were as follows;
IVhen 1 take this top card away, you will see a 
word in the center of each one of these cards. 1 want 
you to make up a sentence using that word. Below the 
word in the center, you will see a group of other 
words. Take any one of these words on the lower line 
and use it to start your sentence. Now, it doesn*t 
matter whether the sentence you make up is long or 
short . . .  complicated or simple. It is important 
that you try to respond with the first sentence that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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enters your mind. Remember, look at the word in the 
center, then look at all the words below it, and make 
up a sentence containing the word in the center and 
beginning with any one of the words below. Any ques­
tions?
Now the first card is a practice card.
If an S displayed any confusion or difficulty on the prac­
tice card, instructions were repeated. Cards were pre­
sented at approximately 10 second intervals. Subjects 
continued to construct sentences until the series of 100 
cards (trials) was completed. Cards were reshuffled for 
each S in order to randomize the effects of order of pre­
sentation.
To establish the operant level for each S without re­
inforcement, no reinforcement was given on Trials 1 through 
20, Beginning with Trial 21 and continuing through Trial 
100, the two pronouns which were least frequently used 
during the 20 operant trials by the individual S were rein­
forced for that S, Thus, the specific pronouns which were 
reinforced varied from S to S» Reinforcement consisted of 
E*s responding with the word, "good," said in a flat, un­
emotional tone immediately following any sentence which S 
began with either of the two critical pronouns. The same 
procedure was used for the Ss in all four groups.
At the completion of the hundredth trial, each S was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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questioned in an effort to determine his awareness of the 
contingency between his behavior and that of E, The fol­
lowing questions were asked and responses were recorded 
verbatim;
1, What do you think it was all about?
2. \fhat did you think about as you went through the 
cards?
3« Did you notice any change in the kinds of words you 
were using?
4, Did you notice any responses that I was making?
If the response to the last question made reference to E*s 
saying "good," an additional question was posed:
5, What do you think was the purpose of my responses?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
RESULTS
The response measure used was the number of reinforced 
pronouns given by each S, For statistical analysis, the 
data were grouped into five blocks of 20 trials each.
Trials 1 through 20, being non-reinforced, served as the 
operant level for critical responses in all groups.
To ascertain if sex was a relevant variable, the learn­
ing curves for the 41 male Ŝ s and the 19 female Ss were 
plotted. The combined curves are presented in Figure 1. 
Since no systematic sex difference was apparent, the data 
for male and female Ss were combined for all remaining 
analyses.
Conditioning. A preliminary analysis of variance of 
response frequency in the operant trial block (Trials 1-20) 
revealed no significant differences in the initial fre­
quency of selecting critical pronouns for the two levels of 
anxiety (F = 1,00)  ̂ nor for High and Low Dogmatism groups
(F = 3.95). The summary of this analysis is presented in 
Table 3. It should be noted that the difference between 
dogmatism groups falls just short of an acceptable level of 
significance (at p = .05, F = 4.02). This suggests that 
there is some tendency for Low Dogmatism groups to be more 
variable in initial selection of pronouns than High Dogmatism
16
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Figure 1. Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for 




Analysis of Variance of Frequency of Critical Pronouns
on Operant Trial Block
Source S3 df MS F p
Dogmatism (D) 6.01 1 6.01 3.95 N.S.
Anxiety (A) .41 1 .41 1,00 N.S.
D X A .82 1 ,82 1.00 N.S.
Error 84.94 56 1,52
Total 92.18 59
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groupe, and thus to use the critical pronouns more often*
The mean frequencies of critical pronouns for each 
trial block for each of the four experimental groups are 
presented in Table 4 and are plotted graphically in Figure 
2» The combined data for the High and Low Dogmatism groups 
and for the High and Low Anxiety groups are presented in 
Table 5 and Figure 3» It is apparent from Tables 4 and 5 
and from Figures 2 and 3 that conditioning in the Low Dog­
matism groups (III and IV) is superior to that in the High 
Dogmatism groups (I and II),
An analysis of variance for repeated measures on the 
same subjects was performed on the frequency of critical 
responses over all trial blocks. The summary of this 
analysis is presented in Table 6, The main effect of dog­
matism is highly significant (F = 11,39), indicating that 
average performance of low dogmatics over all trial blocks 
is significantly better than that of high dogmatics. The 
non-significant interaction between dogmatism and anxiety 
suggests that the difference in conditioning shown by Low 
and High Dogmatism groups is independent of anxiety.
Learning is superior in low dogmatic Ss, regardless of their 
anxiety level® No statistically significant difference be­
tween the anxiety groups is found. These results represent 
a clear-cut reversal of the first hypothesis of this study, 
and provide no support for the second hypothesis.
Because the two levels of anxiety were not perfectly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 4
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for All Groups 
for Each Trial Block
Group
Trials
1 2 3 4 5
I - HD-HA 1.93 4.60 4.13 4.40 4.47
II - HD-LA 2,00 4.07 5.13 4.73 4.87
III - LD-HA 2,80 5.60 5.07 6,47 6,07
IV - LD-LA 2,40 7.47 8.47 7.87 8,33
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Figure 2. Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns 
for All Groups for Each Trial Block
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TABLE 5
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for Combined 
Dogmatism and Anxiety Groups for Each Trial Block
Group
Trials
1 2 3 4 5
HD (I and II) 1.97 4.33 4.63 4.57 4.67
LD (III and IV) 2.60 6.53 6.77 7.17 7.20
HA (I and III) 2.37 5.10 4.60 5.43 5.27
LA (II and IV) 2.20 5.77 6.80 6.30 6.60
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Analysis of Variance of Frequency of 
Critical Pronouns over Trial Blocks
Source S3 df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 306.03 1 306.03 11.39 .01
Anxiety (A) 72.03 1 72.03 2.68 N.S.
D X  A 39.60 1 39.60 1,47 N.S.
Error 1505.17 56 26.87
Trials (T) 580.25 4 145.06 25.84 .001
T X  D 38.52 4 9.63 1.72 N.S.
T X  A 45.58 4 11.40 2.03 N.S.
T X  D X  A 21.75 4 5.44 ————
Error 1257.49 224 5.61
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equated for dogmatism on original scale scores, less re­
liance must be placed in any comparison of anxiety groups.
It should be recalled, however, that lower scores on the 
Dogmatism Scale are present in the Low Anxiety groups than 
in the High Anxiety groups. Since low dogmatism appears 
to be related to superior conditioning, the insignificant 
differences in response which favor the Low Anxiety groups 
would seem to be exaggerated rather than minimized. In 
any event, the hypothesized relationship between high anx­
iety and conditioning ease is clearly not supported by 
these findings.
The significant trials effect (F = 25.84) indicates 
that there is a progressive increment in critical pronoun 
response across trial blocks. The unreliable trials x dog­
matism and trials x anxiety interactions indicate that the 
learning curves do not differ markedly in form for either 
the two dogmatism levels or the two anxiety levels.
Because of the near-significant difference between 
dogmatism groups in the frequency of critical pronouns in 
the operant trial block, an analysis of covariance was per­
formed, In this analysis the four reinforced blocks (Trials 
21-100) were collapsed to yield a combined response fre­
quency for all learning trials, adjusted for operant level. 
The original and adjusted means for all groups are presented 
in Table 7. Table 8 contains the summary of the covariance 
analysis based upon these data. The results reveal that.
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TABLE 7
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns on All 







I (HD-HA) 15 17.60 18.42
II (HD-LA) 15 18.80 19.46
III (LD-HA) 15 23.50 22,28
IV (LD-LA) 15 32.13 31.85
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Covariance of Total Frequency of 
Critical Pronouns on All Reinforced Trials
Source
Adjusted
88 df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 956.28 1 956,28 8.07 .01
Anxiety (A) 509.80 1 509.80 4.30 .05
D X  A 348.41 1 348.41 2.94 N.S.
Within 6518.15 55 118.51
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even when operant differences in critical pronoun response 
frequency are accounted for, Low Dogmatism groups show 
significantly greater over-all conditioning (F = 8,07)o 
In this analysis, the anxiety effect is barely significant 
at the ,05 level (F = 4*30) indicating significantly high­
er repense levels in Low Anxiety groups than in High Anx­
iety groups* Interaction effects again lack significance.
In order to determine if significant learning was 
present in each group, the change in the frequency of 
critical responses from the first to the last trial block 
was calculated. Such a measure uses each S^s operant per­
formance as a basis for improvement and is obtained by sub­
tracting the response frequency for the first block of 
trials from that of the last block of trials. These mean 
improvement scores for all groups are presented in Table 
9, The results of t-tests (for correlated measures), run 
on the scores of each group, reveal that all groups show 
highly significant increases in the use of reinforced pro­
nouns (Table 9), These findings indicate that, although 
conditioning is greater in some groups than in others, 
significant learning occurs in all groups.
Awareness, Data collected at the end of each experi­
mental session concerning S*s awareness of reinforcement 
contingency were analyzed to determine possible differences 
between groups in awareness and the possible effect of
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Mean Improvement Scores 
For All Groups
Group N Mean S.D. t *P
I (HD-HA) 15 2.53 3.34 2.85 .01
II (HD-LA) 15 2.87 3.71 2.98 .01
III (LD-HA) 15 3.27 3.88 3.26 .01
IV (LD-LA) 15 5.93 4.81 4.78 .01
* Probabilities given are for a one-tailed test,
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awareness on conditioning behavior. An S was designated as 
being aware if he could indicate either one or both of the 
critical pronouns for which reinforcement was given. Of 
the total 60 Ss, thirteen, or slightly less than 22 percent 
showed awareness, as defined. Six high dogmatic Ss and 7 
low dogmatic Ss were able to specify the correct response- 
reinforcement contingency, while 4 high anxious Ss and 9 
low anxious Ss could do so. A comparison of the distribu­
tion of aware Ss in the dogmatism groups and in the anxiety 
groups was made and results are presented in Table 10. The 
non-significant chi-square values indicate that no system­
atic differences exist in the number of aware Ss in either 
the two dogmatism groups or in the two anxiety groups.
Although no significant differences exist in the pro­
portion of aware Ss at the two levels of either dogmatism 
or anxiety, there existed the possibility that awareness 
might differentially affect conditioning in these groups. 
Data relevant to this are presented in Table 11, where mean 
frequencies of critical pronouns are presented for the aware 
and unaware groups, each of which is broken down for the two 
levels of dogmatism and anxiety. Learning curves based on 
these data are plotted in Figures 4 and 5* for dogmatism and 
anxiety respectively. It can easily be seen that awareness 
is related to superior conditioning in all groups.
To determine the significance of awareness data, a se­
ries of covariance analyses, controlling for initial operant
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TABLE 10
Numbers of Aware Subjects in High and Low Dogmatism and 
High and Low Anxiety Groups
Group N
Number
Aware «Chi- *Square p
High Dogmatism 30 6
0,00 N.S,
Low Dogmatism 30 7
High Anxiety 30 4
1,57 N,S,
Low Anxiety 30 9
^Corrected for continuity (1 df)
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TABLE 11
Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for 
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Figure 5« Mean Frequency of Critical Pronouns for 
Aware and Unaware Anxiety Groups for 
All Trial Blocks
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level, was performed on the total response frequencies for 
the four reinforced trial blocks combined. Separate anal­
yses compared aware vs. unaware Ss (irrespective of group), 
the two dogmatism groups at each level of awareness, and 
the two anxiety groups at each level of awareness. A sum­
mary of these analyses is presented in Table 12. Complete 
summary tables for each analysis can be found in Appendix 
D. The highly significant difference (F = 9*79) for the 
total group of aware and unaware Ŝ s confirms that the ease 
of conditioning is related to awareness in the present 
study. Conditioning scores are significantly higher for 
unaware low dogmatics than for unaware high dogmatics 
(F = 5*42), but the difference between aware low dogmatics 
and aware high dogmatics fails to reach significance. Both 
comparisons of High and Low Anxiety groups lacked signifi­
cance.
These findings seem to indicate that performance dif­
ferences between High and Low Dogmatism groups are a func­
tion of the level of awareness present. Although there is 
a consistent tendency for greater conditioning in the Low 
Dogmatism groups as compared to the High Dogmatism groups, 
the statistical significance of this superiority disappears 
when Ss in both groups are able to verbalize the reinforce­
ment contingency. Only when Ss are unaware do the signifi­
cant dogmatism differences remain.
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TABLE 12
Summary of Analyses of Covariance of Total Frequency of 
Critical Pronouns on All Reinforced Trials 
for Aware and Unaware Groups
Source df F P
Aware vs Unaware 1 and 57 9,79 .01
Aware
HD vs LD 1 and 10 1.14 N.S.
HA vs LA 1 and 10 2.39 N.S.
Unaware 
HD vs LD 1 and 44 5.42 .025
HA vs LA 1 and 44 1.00 N.S.
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DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate the re­
lationship of dogmatism and anxiety to reinforcement effects 
in a verbal conditioning situation. The findings fail to 
confirm the Taffel (1955) and Sarason (1957) studies which 
reported that high anxious subjects performed better than 
low anxious subjects in a verbal conditioning situation.
The present results show a trend for better performance in 
Low Anxiety groups, although these differences are not con­
sistently significant. The Taylor drive theory of anxiety 
has been consistently supported in simple classical condi­
tioning studies. In more complex tasks, however, anxiety 
has frequently been found to have interfering effects which 
offset the facilitating effect of drive (Child, 1954)»
Taylor (1956) has pointed out that her theory is an extreme­
ly restricted one referring only to the effects of drive 
level in relatively simple learning situations. The find­
ings of the present study would seem to underscore this 
position. Taken in conjunction with similar results ob­
tained by Daily (1953) and by Buss and Gerjuoy (1958) these 
findings suggest that anxiety, as here measured, is either 
a relatively minor variable contributing to operant verbal 
conditioning scores, or that, when obtained, differences
37
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might be considered more fruitfully in terms of other factors 
with which anxiety might be correlated.
Neither do the present findings support the hypothesis, 
based upon the theoretical assumptions of Rokeach, that high 
scorers on the Dogmatism Scale are more susceptible to arbi­
trary reinforcement and therefore show greater conditioning 
than do low scorers. To the contrary, the results point to 
a reversal of this hypothesis, with low dogmatism being 
consistently related to superior performance in the present 
conditioning situation. Since anxiety was equated for the 
dogmatism groups, the differences in conditioning for the 
two levels of dogmatism cannot be attributed to the ef­
fects of anxiety, as measured by the MAS,
How can the superior conditioning of low dogmatics 
best be accounted for? One possibility is that open-minded 
persons might be more variable in verbal responses and 
therefore the critical pronouns are likely to occur earlier 
and to be reinforced earlier after the introduction of re­
inforcement, Conversely, the closed-minded subjects might 
be more fixed in the choice of pronouns, making it more 
likely that the low operant level pronouns would occur 
later and be reinforced later. Conditioning would thereby 
be facilitated for Low Dogmatism groups and retarded for 
High Dogmatism groups. The almost significant difference 
between High and Low Dogmatism groups in usage of critical 
pronouns on operant trials would seem to support this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
possibility. Upon investigation, however, no differences 
were found in the occurrence of initial reinforcement for 
the two levels of dogmatism. The median trial point at 
which the first reinforcement was given was 22,5 for low 
dogmatic subjects, while it was 23,0 for the high dogmatic 
group. Differential onset of reinforcement thus does not 
appear to account for the greater response strength in the 
Low Dogmatism group. The low dogmatic appears to use the 
critical pronouns more often throughout— in response to 
reinforcement, as well as prior to reinforcement.
Another possible post hoc explanation for these re­
sults stems from Rokeach*s theory itself, Rokeach^s sug­
gestion that high dogmatics are more influenced by arbitrary 
external reinforcements appears to follow largely from his 
theoretical notions regarding their closed orientations to 
authority. This is postulated to lead to a heightened 
sensitivity to the behavior of authority figures. The pres­
ent findings, pointing to the greater influence of verbal 
reinforcement for low dogmatics, seem to be difficult to 
reconcile with this theoretical position. However, these 
results might be viewed as quite consistent with many of 
the other defining characteristics laid doim for this mul­
tidimensional concept of dogmatism. Much of Rokeach*s own 
description of the comparative functioning of low and high 
dogmatics offers possible explanation for the present find­
ings, This raises the question of whether the major
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hypothesis of this study might not have been inadequately 
derived from the theory upon which it is based.
It seems possible that the expectation for greater 
conditioning in the High Dogmatism groups may have been 
falsely grounded on the assumption that arbitrary rein­
forcement, as used in this study, is "irrelevant" infor­
mation. Rokeach states that a person’s belief system may 
be considered opened or closed to the extent that he "can 
receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information from 
the outside on its oxm. intrinsic merits, unencumbered by 
irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the 
person or from the outside." (Rokeach, I960; p. 57) It 
might be argued that, in the present conditioning situation, 
there is no source of information available to the subject 
except for the experimenter. Therefore, the reinforcements 
which are forthcoming from the experimenter are bits of 
relevant information. They provide the only available ex­
ternal guide to behavior for the subject. Response to the 
experimenter’s reinforcements then becomes rational depend­
ence on authority, because the experimenter supplies infor­
mation which is otherwise lacking in the situation or in 
the person’s experiential background. Viewed in this way, 
the open-minded person, who is theoretically more able to 
make cognitive discriminations and to separate relevant 
from irrelevant information, might well be expected to re­
spond more readily in this conditioning situation.
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In this connection, Kanfer and McBrearty (1961) have 
suggested that the Taffel task used in the present study 
may be more of a discrimination problem than a free oper­
ant conditioning situation. It is suggested by these 
authors that the limited range of responses open to the 
subject might make the ability to differentiate the crucial 
responses an important determinant of performance which 
operates in addition to reinforcement. Such a view would 
further strengthen the expectation for superior performance 
by low dogmatics. This raises the question, however, of 
whether the present experimental task, if it is partially 
a discrimination problem, can serve as a fully adequate 
test of the susceptibility to arbitrary reinforcement pres­
sures postulated for the high dogmatics by Rokeach. Cer­
tainly, before any generalizations can be made regarding 
the association of dogmatism to conditioning or reinforce­
ment effects per se, other conditioning situations need to 
be investigated using the dogmatism variable.
The results of the present study reem to suggest that 
low dogmatic persons are more attuned to and accepting of 
all incoming information, including the reinforcements of 
the experimenter. On the other hand, high dogmatic persons 
seem to be literally more "closed" to the objective meaning 
of incoming stimuli, IVhat seems to be implied here is that 
the phenomenal field of the high dogmatic may be narrower 
than that of the low dogmatic in the present situation, ” As
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a result, reinforcements are more likely to be excluded as 
effective stimuli for response. Snygg and Combs (1950) and 
MacLeod (1947), among others, have pointed out that the in­
dividual can respond only to that which is phenomenalogical- 
ly present for him at the moment.
Although Rokeach does not utilize to any significant 
extent the construct of "phenomenal field," this would seem 
to be consistent with his statements that a person "screens" 
new information for compatibility with his belief system, 
(Rokeach, I96O; p. 48) He further suggests that in the 
high dogmatic, new information "must be tampered with— nar­
rowing it out, altering it, or containing it within iso­
lated bounds" while the belief-disbelief system is left 
intact. (Rokeach, I960; p. 50). However, in the low dog­
matic new information is assimilated as is by being 
reconciled with old beliefs or by changing internal organi­
zation.
Rather than considering the organization of the per­
ceptual field alone, Rokeach (I960) generally prefers to 
account for the differential behaviors of high and low 
dogmatics in terms of more illusive dynamic factors in the 
history or the need systems of the individual. These are 
felt to underlie the cognitive and/or perceptual handling 
of stimuli. He consistently proposes that high dogmatics 
are more susceptible to disruptive internal motivations as 
represented by a wide range of affective needs and by
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inappropriate habits and sets. They feel more alone, help­
less, and inadequate in their dealings with the world 
(p. 69). They are reported to be more threatened by, and 
more rejecting of, experimental situations (p. I96). They 
have less capacity to entertain novel situations, and a 
greater need to protect themselves in such situations (p. 
211). Rigidity and dogmatism tend to go together (corre­
lations range from .37 to *55 between rigidity scales and 
the Dogmatism Scale), with closed-minded persons being 
more resistant to change (p. 196),
Any or all of these characteristics conceivably could 
affect negatively the functioning of high dogmatics in the 
present conditioning situation. This seems even more 
likely when two facts are considered; (1) subjects were 
naive and inexperienced in research participation, and (2) 
the majority of subjects verbalized the belief that the 
experimental procedure was a "personality test" of some 
kind. Presumably, both of these factors would tend to en­
hance the novel and threatening character of the experi­
mental situation. If, indeed, irrelevant internal 
motivations are more operative in the high dogmatic, one 
could expect more restrictions in the perceptual field of 
the high dogmatic in the present situation.
MacLeod (1947) makes the point, however, that the 
important question is "VVhat is there?" for the individual 
without regard to Wxy, Whence, or Wherefore. Snygg and
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Combs (1950) also insist that predictions can be based on 
the dynamics of the perceptual field itself, without know­
ing why it is organized as it is* The suggestion made 
here is that, for whatever reasons, the phenomenal field 
of the high dogmatic may be more restricted than that of 
the low dogmatic in the present situation* Consequently, 
arbitrarily introduced reinforcements are less likely to 
be received by the high dogmatic, or, if received, they 
are less likely to be organized in a way which is consist­
ent with the intent of the experimenter* The latter case 
might be couched in stimulus-response terms by stating 
that the reinforcement becomes "attached" to a response 
other than that for which it was intended* Salzinger 
(1959) points to several studies where there was a dis­
crepancy between the experimenter’s definition of the re­
sponse class and the response class which was actually 
being affected by the reinforcement* This, of course, does 
not mean necessarily that reinforcement is not effective, 
although strictly speaking one cannot always know* The 
point seems to be, however, that the specific response for 
which reinforcement is or is not effective apparently is 
not always under the control of the experimenter, but is 
dependent upon organization of the phenomenal field of the 
subject*
The pertinent question here is whether scores on the 
Dogmatism Scale characteristically differentiate individuals
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in their ability to encompass more or less of the "objective" 
environment in the momentary phenomenal field. One might 
conjecture that the "My-mind*s-made-upj don't-confuse-me- 
with-facts" behavior of the high dogmatic actually reflects 
a certain delimiting in the organization of the perceptual 
field. The facts simply are not incorporated or are per­
ceived in a personally-derived way which is more likely to 
differ from the way in which they are perceived by the ob­
server, In a novel problem solving situation, Rokeach and 
Vidulich (Rokeach, I96O, p, 212) concluded that although the 
high dogmatic went along with the task? he was "not really 
prepared psychologically" to entertain the novel situation. 
When, however, new beliefs were artificially fed into the 
phenomenal field by means of printed "hints" placed in 
front of the subject, appropriate response was significant­
ly facilitated, Tatz (1956) found significantly better 
verbal conditioning in groups which were informed that cor­
rect responses would be followed by "good" than in "no 
information" groups. The reinforcement seems to have be­
come more effective for the specified response because it 
was artificially made a part of the subject’s phenomenal 
field by means of the instructions,
A similar procedure might well be used to investigate 
the proposition that high and low dogmatics differ in the 
alacrity with which they meaningfully perceive the rein­
forcement as objectively applied. If the low dogmatic is
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more "open" to all stimuli in the situation, they should 
show greater reinforcement effects even when given a de­
scription of the task which artificially creates a field 
which is inconsistent with the imposed reinforcement con­
tingency (e.g. "This is a masculinity-femininity test").
On the other hand, if the description is such that it 
creates for the subject an appropriate perceptual field, 
such as in Tatz* "informed" groups, the difference in high 
and low dogmatics should not be significant.
If low scorers on the Dogmatism Scale are indeed more 
open or receptive to incoming information, it might have 
been thought that they might tend to become more aware 
than high scorers in the present study. Such was not the 
case. It should be pointed out, however, that an all-or- 
none dichotomous classification of awareness such as was 
used is, at best, an extremely rough measure of awareness. 
In the same study reported above, Tatz (1956) used a 30- 
item open-ended questionnaire which yielded four degrees 
of awareness. He concluded that subjects may evolve 
"partial solutions" which are not always verbalized in 
post-experimental questioning, but which nevertheless me­
diate a higher response level. Krasner (1958) also ques­
tions the adequacy of present measures in picking up 
awareness "as it really exists." These approaches would 
seem to suggest a definition of awareness which is not un­
like the "breadth of phenomenal field" concept which is
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posited above.
Once awareness has reached the point where verbaliza­
tion is possible, reinforcement becomes more effective for 
all groups in the present study. Although the direction 
of differences between groups remains stable, only the 
difference between low dogmatic and high dogmatic subjects 
who are unaware is significant. The insensitive measure 
of awareness and the small numbers in the aware groups 
call for caution in interpreting or generalizing these re­
sults, Clarification through future investigations of the 
relationship of dogmatism and awareness is needed.
It hardly needs pointing out that the demonstrated 
association of low dogmatism with better conditioning per­
formance does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship. 
Under the present experimental conditions, however, scores 
on the Dogmatism Scale do appear to differentiate groups 
in the conditioning of verbal behavior. Only replication 
of this study, and many studies of the dogmatism variable 
in a variety of conditioning situations can confirm or re­
ject the predictive potential which is suggested by these 
findings.
The results of this study also suggest the importance 
of subject characteristics in accounting for some of the 
uncontrolled variability typically found in verbal condi­
tioning studies. The obvious difficulties involved and 
the limited conclusions which can be drawn from such studies
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undoubtedly have discouraged efforts to pin down individual 
characteristics which may be related to reinforcement ef­
fects, However, a fuller knowledge of these subject vari­
ables may be vital in achieving greater understanding of 
the many factors which determine conditioning of this kind.
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APPENDIX A
DOGMATISM SCALE (FORM E)
The following is a study of what the general public 
thinks and feels about a number of important social and 
personal questions» The best answer to the statements 
below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover 
many different and opposing points of view; you may find 
yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, 
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps un­
certain about others. Whether you agree or disagree with 
any statement, you can be sure many other people feel the 
same way you do,
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how 
much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. 
Write +1, +2, +3> or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel 
in each case.
+1 1 AGREE A LITTLE -1
+2 1 AGREE PRETTY MUCH -2
+3 1 AGREE VERY MUCH -3
1 DISAGREE A LITTLE 
1 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH 
1 DISAGREE VERY MUCH
1. A person who thinks primarily of his own happi­
ness is beneath contempt.
2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to 
do something important.
3. In a discussion, 1 often find it necessary to re­
peat myself several times to make sure 1 am being 
understood,
4. Most people just don*t know what*s good for them.
5. In times like these, a person must be pretty self­
ish if he considers his ovm happiness primarily.
6. A man who does not believe in some great cause has 
not really lived.
7. I*d like it if 1 could find someone who would tell 
me how to solve my personal problems.
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8, Of all the different philosophies which have ex­
isted in this world, there is probably only one 
which is correct.
9. It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal 
or cause that his life becomes meaningful.
10. In this complicated world of ours, the only way 
we can know what is going on is to rely upon 
leaders or experts who can be trusted,
11. There are a number of persons I have come to hate 
because of the things they stand for,
12. There is so much to be done and so little time to 
do it in,
13. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
14® A group which tolerates too much difference of 
opinion among its own members cannot exist for 
long.
15. It is only natural that a person should have a 
much better acquaintance with ideas he believes 
in than with ideas he opposes.
16. While I don’t like to admit this even to myself,
I sometime have the ambition to become a great 
man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare,
17. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a 
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary at 
times to restrict the freedom of certain political 
groups.
18. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it 
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing 
at all."
19. Most people just don’t give a "damn" about others.
20. Any person who gets enthusiastic about a number of 
causes is likely to be a pretty wishy-washy sort 
of person.
21. To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal 
of our own side.
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22# If given the chance, I would do something that 
would be of great benefit to the world.
23, In times like these, it is often necessary to
be more on guard against ideas put out by certain 
people or groups in one*s own camp than by those 
in the opposing camp#
24# In a heated discussion I usually become so ab­
sorbed in what I am going to say that I forget 
to listen to what others are saying#
25# Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I 
just can’t stop.
26# There are two kinds of people in this world} 
those who are on the side of truth, and those 
who are against it#
27# Man on his own is a helpless and miserable 
creature.
28# The United States and Russia have just about noth­
ing in common#
29# In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers#
30# The highest form of government is a democracy and 
the highest form of democracy is a government run 
by those who are most intelligent#
31# The present is all too often full of unhappiness; 
it is the future that counts#
32# Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems 
don’t really understand what is going on#
33# Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty 
lonely place.
34» It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what’s going on until one has had a chance to hear 
the opinions of those one respects#
35# The worse crime a person can commit is to attack 
publicly the people who believe in the same thing 
he does.
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36, In the long run, the best way to live is to pick 
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs 
are the same as one*s own.
37, Most of the ideas that get published nowadays
aren't worth the paper they are printed on,
38, It is only natural for a person to be rather
fearful of the future,
39, My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly re­
fuses to admit he is wrong,
40, IVhen it comes to differences of opinion in re­
ligion, we must be careful not to compromise 
with those who believe differently from the way 
we do.




Place a T in front of those questions which you per­
sonally consider true of yourself, and an F in front of 
those questions which you personally think are false of 
yourself•
1. I do not tire quickly»
2» I am often sick of my stomach.
3. I am about as nervous as other people.
4* I have very few headaches»
5. I work under a great deal of strain,
6, I cannot keep my mind on one thing.
7» I worry over business and money.
8. I frequently notice my hand shakes when I 
try to do something.
9. I blush as often as others.
10. I have diarrhea ("the runs”) once a month 
or more.
11. I worry quite a bit ovei* possible troubles. 
12» I practically never blush,
13. I am often afraid that I am going to blush.
14. I have nightmares every few nights.
15." My hands and feet are usually warm enough.
16. I sweat very easily even on cool days.
17. ^Vhen embarrassed I often break out in a 
sweat which is very annoying.
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18, I do not often notice my heart pounding and
I am seldom short of breath,
19» I feel hungry almost all the time,
20, Often my bowels don*t move for several days 
at a time,
21, I have a great deal of stomach trouble,
22, At times I lose sleep over worry,
23* My sleep is restless and disturbed,
24. I often dream about things I don't like to 
tell other people,
25* I am easily embarrassed,
26, My feelings are hurt easier than most 
people®
27, I often find myself worrying about some­
thing.
28, I wish I could be as happy as others,
29, I am usually calm and not easily upset,
30, I cry easily,
31, I feel anxious about something or someone 
almost all the time,
32, I am happy most of the time,
33, It makes me nervous to have to wait,
34, At times I am so restless that I cannot sit 
in a chair for very long,
35, Sometimes I become so excited that I find it 
hard to get to sleep,
36, I have often felt that I faced so many dif­
ficulties I could not overcome them,
37, At times I have been worried beyond reason 
about something that really did not matter.
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38. I do not have as many fears as my friends.
39* I have been afraid of things or people that 
I know could not hurt me.
40. I certainly feel useless at times.
41. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or 
job.
42. I am more self-conscious than most people.
43. I am the kind of person who takes things 
hard.
44* I am a very nervous person.
45. Life is often a strain for me,
46. I am not at all confident of myself.
47. At times X think I am no good at all.
48. At times I feel that I am going to crack up,
49* I don't like to face a difficulty or make 
an important decision,
50, I am very confident of myself.




1. RAN 24. STOOD 47. SWAM 70. WANTED
2. PAID 25. LIVED 48. LISTENED 71. SENT
3. SANG 26. TALKED 49. NEEDED 72. OPENED
4. LIFTED 27. READ 50. DRANK 73. SPENT
5. WORE 28. FOUND 51. HURRIED 74. WENT
6. WATCHED 29. LOVED 52. ASKED 75. TOLD
7o LEFT 30. SET 53. ATE 76. THOUGHT
8. RANG 31. JOINED 54. DREAMED 77. STARTED
9. PULLED 32. SLEPT 55. CAME • 78. HIT
10. LAUGHED 33. LOST 56. THREW 79. HEARD
11. CLOSED 34. CUT 57. SPILLED 80. TRIED
12. FELL 35. BROUGHT 58. DARED 81. TAUGHT
13. DROVE 36. STOPPED 59. LEARNED 82. LIKED
14. CLEANED 37. CAUGHT 60. FILLED 83. LOOKED
15. SAT 38. PUSHED 61. CHOSE 84. KNEW
16. OWNED 39. WASHED 62. MADE • 85. QUIT
17. DRESSED 40. TURNED 63. WROTE 86. WON
18. PUT 41. SMOKED 64. DREW 87. CLIMBED
19. HELD 42. MOVED 65. RODE 88. PRAISED
20. PASSED 43. WALKED 66. SHUT 89. SPOKE
21. CALLED 44. TORE 67. PAINTED 90. SAID
22. BEGAN 45. DUG 68. TOOK 91. WORKED
23. SHOOK 46. HID 69. SAW 92. FED
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93. PLAYED 95. STUDIED 97. MET 99. BOUGHT
94. FLEW 96. RECEIVED 98. PICKED 100. DROPPED
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SÜMMARieS'OF ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE FOR 
AWARE AND UNAWARE GROUPS
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AWARE vs UNAWARE (Total)
Source
Adjusted
SS df MS F P
Awareness 1211,05 1 1211.05 9.79 .01
Within 7046.57 57 123.62
Total 8257.62 58
AWARE HD vs AWARE LD
Source
Adjusted
SS df MS F P
HD vs LD 213.89 1 213.89 1.14 N.S,
Within 1877.34 10 187.73
Total 2091.23 11
AWARE HA vs AWARE LA
Source
Adjusted
SS df MS F P
HA vs LA 402.90 1 402.90 2.39 N.S,
Within 1688.33 10 168.83
Total 2091.23 11
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APPENDIX D (ContM.)
UNAWARE HD vs UNAWARE LD
Source
Adjusted
SS df MS F P
HD vs LD 519.24 1 519.24 5.42 ,025
Within 4219.28 44 95.89
Total 4738.52 45
UNAWARE HA vs UNAWARE LA
Source
Adjusted
SS df MS F P
HA vs LA 84.61 1 84.61 1,00 N.S.
Within 4738.52 44 108.60
Total
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